The Proposed Reforms from Mark Pieth's 2011 Report Unimplemented by FIFA

Below you can find the recommendations made by Mark Pieth in 2011 in his report Governing FIFA which I have identified as having not been adopted by FIFA in its reform process. These recommendations comprise part of the reform evaluation which I recent discussed at Play the Game back in June and to which FIFA responded to here.

After preparing the report for FIFA, Professor Pieth got into a bit of hot water when he was subsequently appointed to chair the FIFA Independent Governance Committee and it was learned that his institute had accepted from FIFA an undisclosed $128,000 plus a $5,000 daily fee to prepare the report.

Overall, I identified 15 statements in the form of recommendations in the 2011 Pieth report. Of those 15, FIFA failed to even partially implement 13. Those 13 are listed below, to aid in discussion and (ideally) debate. Questions worth thinking about include: Which ones are most important? Which ones are secondary? Which may be off the mark? Comments welcomed either here or via email.

I've blogged on the unimplemented recommendations from the Transparency International report Safe Hands: Building Transparency and Integrity at FIFA and shortly I will also list those recommendations unimplemented found in the first report of the FIFA IGC.

• FIFA could further upgrade its existing financial governance, in particular by: developing a catalogue of potentially critical payments, and by deciding whether direct controls are warranted or whether indirect controls could be sufficient; 
• . . . intensifying its specific anti-corruption controls within existing COSO. 
• FIFA should upgrade its compliance system to meet the requirements of a state of the art corporate anti-corruption compliance programme (including a review of the Code of Ethics, the risk analysis, the detailed rules on contributions etc. and the hiring of third parties, education and training as well as notification channels). Particular emphasis needs to be placed on the credible implementation of the programme. Member Associations and Confederations should be encouraged to adopt comparable standards. 
• On an organisational level, FIFA should consider electing independent members into the ExCo. 
• A Compensation and Benefits Committee should decide over benefits of officials of FIFA bodies and senior staff. 
• Candidates should announce their wish to stand sufficiently ahead of the election. 
• FIFA should examine a system of campaign financing which provides officially announced candidates with sufficient backing (a certain number of Member Associations) with FIFA funding, ruling out further private campaign contributions. 
• FIFA should consider limiting terms of office of its officials. 
• FIFA should consider introducing regular due diligence checks by the Ethics Committee on elected Members of its bodies. A regulation should specify cases of incompatibility with the FIFA function. The regulation should also define the procedure, and clarify under which circumstances an official would be temporarily suspended from his function. 
• Decisions on hosting and on commercialising would greatly benefit, beyond a review of the actual procedures, of an overall abstract strategy, defined by relevant Committees and ratified by Congress. 
• An institution of the size and significance of FIFA needs a state of the art conflict of interest regulation, indicating cases of conflict and specifying the procedures (up to a possible recusal). While a conflict of interest regulation is a general requirement, it will be particularly useful to prevent abuses and adverse publicity in FIFA’s relations to Members. 
• Additional preventive measures ensuring transparency and accountability in its relations with Members should be taken in the area of financial contributions for the development of football in countries and regions
• Members should be taken in the area of financial contributions for the development of football in countries and regions. An overall strategy should be adopted for the multitude of historically grown funds. They should be governed in a comparable manner, and expenditure as well as uses audited on the standard of the Goal Programme and FAP.